In an effort to make its business model more transparent to investors and customers, Medco Based on a theory of market share rebates as exclusionary, rather than share-shifting, devices, we have estimated that Medco has a rebate negotiation competitive advantage over smaller entities equal to 4.8% of all ingredient costs. That figure is an estimate of the cost to clients of switching to entities with more transparent business models. In order to offset that loss, smaller entities would have to manage formularies aggressively and produce a generic utilization rate that is 4.8 percentage points greater than Medco's current 46.8% 
Introduction
The management of the drug benefit portion of healthcare plans has become the domain of contracted specialists called pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs). The three largest, independent PBMs --Medco Health Solutions, Inc, Express Scripts, Inc., and Caremark Rx, Inc., (known as "The Big 3") --have come under attack in the past few years for not acting in the best interest of their clients. The source of the problem is attributed to a business model that lacks transparency and is too dependent on rebates retained from brand name drug manufacturers. PBMs are also criticized for earning a spread on reimbursements and under-pricing their own mail order services in order to siphon business away from retail pharmacies. Many of the solutions to this conflict of interest problem involve switching to entities with different business models. This includes creating PBM operations in-house or switching to PBMs professing a "flat fee" business model with 100% pass-through of rebates. For self-insured Fortune 500 companies, it includes forming a "group preference organization" (GPO) to negotiate rebates on their behalf. information about the sources of PBM profitability. While there is antidotal information about "the spread" and some evidence that a single PBM engaged in predatory pricing to win a federal mail order pharmacy contract, there does not exist estimates of these margins based on official financial statements. 1 2 Until recently, PBMs disclosed only the most aggregate of information in their financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Gross and net rebates were never broken out from other reimbursements. Mail order revenue was reported as a separate line item, but not mail order costs or mail order margins.
The purpose of this paper is to make Medco's business model more transparent by disaggregating gross profits by revenue sources and, more appropriately, by revenue "driver".
We will present an estimate of Medco's rebate negotiating power as measured by gross rebates received as a percentage of ingredient costs. This statistic becomes relevant in cost-benefit discussions of choosing providers other than the Big 3. 3 Also, the results can be useful in evaluating the claim that low mail order pharmacy margins offset by rebate retention is an anticompetitive device employed by the Big 3 to exclude independent mail order pharmacies from the marketplace. 4 An 
The Matching Principle As Applied to Medco's Financials
Generally accepted accounting principles dictate that, to the extent possible, sources of revenue should be "matched" with the costs that "drive" that revenue. This matching should be done when accounting by time period and by line of business. The major weakness of the analysis presented so far is that it fails to fully align revenue with cost drivers. We believe that the primary reason why PBMs choose to assume the role of principal, rather than agent, in managing network providers, is to claim ownership of the transaction. This gives them the right to receive rebates and data fees. It is ownership of the transaction that distinguishes PBMs from pharmacy benefit administrators (PBAs). Rebates and data fees are driven by retail and mail order transactions. In the spirit of the matching principle, these revenue sources should not stand alone in a financial statement. It might be argued that formulary management is a separate business driver deserving a separate line on a financial statement. But, formulary management without concurrent ownership of the transaction would only merit management fees from clients. It is the coupling of formulary management with ownership of the transaction that causes brand name drug companies to deal directly with PBMs.
The lower portion of Table 2 divides Medco's gross profits into two basic business drivers: (1) retail transactions, and (2) mail order transactions. We start out by distributing total reimbursements by channel as reported by Medco. Next, we refine that by considering only the distribution of brand name drug transactions by channel. This focus is based on our contention that 100% of the rebates received by Medco are from brand manufacturers. Brand name manufacturers target rebates at that point in the pharmaceutical supply chain where demand for their product is discretionary. They know that brand drug procurement by pharmacies is derived and non-discretionary. Brand pharmaceutical manufacturers negotiate price concessions with PBMs, not pharmacies, because only PBMs have discretion in influencing choices among therapeutic equivalents through formulary design and compliance.
On the other hand, pharmacies do have the power to choose one generic manufacturer's product over another's as they are near perfect substitutes. As a result, generic drug manufacturers efforts to sway demand are channeled into substantial charge-back credits posted to pharmacies' accounts at distributors.
It has been documented that a disproportionate share of brand name drugs flow through the mail order channel. Sales of drugs used to treat chronic illnesses such as high cholesterol, hypertension, diabetes, acid reflux disease, and arthritis tend to be dominated by on-patent brand name drugs. Furthermore, patients with chronic illnesses can be served well by mail order pharmacies because immediate availability is rarely an issue. As a result, we revised the initial distribution of rebates to take into account drug mix by channel.
We further revised this distribution to take into account what we believe is a special synergy between formulary compliance and captive mail order operations. It is rare in the health care market where the payor is also the provider. Ownership of mail order operations by insurance companies with captive PBMs suggests that there is a powerful economic synergy between mail order operations and the parent PBM. The preference for captive mail order pharmacies by independent PBMs with rebate retention suggests that the synergy is in the area of discretionary, formulary compliance. Furthermore, the fact that both independent PBMs and captive PBMs of insurance companies prefer to own their own mail order operations suggests that the discretionary, formulary compliance is of the "win-win" variety -beneficial to both the payor and the provider. Our effort to quantify the financial impact of this synergy is in process. For now, we estimate that this powerful synergy causes as much as a 6-percentage points swing in rebates into the mail order driver column.
Even though only 45.9% of Medco's reimbursements come from captive mail order pharmacy operations, we have estimated that 55% of its gross rebate receipts are attributable to that business driver. The other key result of this exercise is that Medco's mail order driver margin-mail order margin adjusted by rebates driven by this business --is at a pro-competitive 7.2%. This estimate has relevance for antitrust concerns about mail order pharmacy pricing by large PBMs.
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Quantifying Medco's Rebate Negotiating Power
One month after Medco first disclosed its rebate-retention rate, officers of the company presented graphs at two separate investors conferences that revealed that it received two types of rebates --"formulary" and "market share" -and that the distribution of receipts between the two was 54%
and 46%, respectively. 10 11 Based on that information, it is possible to derive an estimate of Medco's rebate negotiating power as measured by gross rebates received as a percentage of all drug ingredient costs. The derivation is presented below in Table 3 . The basic result is that, on average, Medco is able to negotiate rebates equaling 10.9% of brand ingredient cost and 8.7% of all ingredient costs.
We believe that these estimates are based on reasonable assumptions. The rest is simple arithmetic. In order to convert the dollar rebates received into percentages, we had to make assumptions about Medco's ingredient costs before rebates. We assumed that generic and brand prescription ingredient costs, paid by Medco's clients, across all fulfillment channels, average $22 and $75, respectively. We also assume that the gross and net rebate figures Medco reported did not include charge-back credits from generic drug manufacturers. These credits should be applied to mail order pharmacy costs and not included in gross rebate receipts. There is antidotal evidence from industry analysts that generic drug manufacturers do not pay rebates to
PBMs. This has not been explicitly confirmed by PBMs. In any case, there is a solid rationale, presented earlier, for assuming that the rebate numbers disclosed by Medco only includes rebates from brand name drug manufacturers. Various sources produce estimates of rebates ranging from 2 percent to 35 percent of drug sales prices. These rebates are not reflected in retail prices, but are instead paid directly to insurers and other organizations that manage drug benefits after they have already reimbursed the pharmacy.
Because there is a wide variation in rebate rates negotiated between PBMs and drug companies, the 10.9% figure does not adequately reflect Medco' rebate negotiating power. What is needed is an estimate of the components parts and associated weights that roll up into the 10.9% average.
The key to this exercise is a theory of why drug manufacturers give rebates to PBMs in the first place. Why give rebates to PBMs and not pharmacies or plan sponsors? Volume rebates are a fairly common occurrence in business. The use of market share rebates by manufacturers is fairly rare. We believe that the dual use of volume rebates and market share rebates is extremely rare in American business. Is this dual occurrence complementary or coincidental? The language currently found in industry literature describes rebates in terms of their role in influencing formulary placement and preference in order to shift market share among existing brand drugs that are therapeutic equivalents. We have become dissatisfied with the current view of market share rebates as share-shifting view of market share rebates devices. In too many instances, we see two or more brand name drugs given "tier 2" preference in the national formularies developed by large PBMs. If market share rebates are designed to induce competition for market share, why do we observe both Zocor and Lipitor or both Nexium and Protonix, being preferred in national formularies as indicated in Table 4 . Our investigation has not been systematic and has been limited to 4 of the top 10 selling therapeutic classes -statins, proton pump inhibitors, COX-2 inhibitors, and second generation antihistamines. Yet, the existence of two brand name drugs in "tier 2" therapeutic classes is highly inconsistent with the current language use to describe the role of market share rebates. To us, the evidence suggests that the incentives for exclusive preference in a formulary are weak. We have adopted a completely different language to describe the use of rebates. It is based on recent theoretical work of economists on the exclusionary role of market share rebates. 13 The function of both types of rebates has little to do with competition for market share between existing therapeutic equivalents, but everything to do with creating barriers to entry by "me-too" drugs. The patent system protects only chemical novelty in drugs not therapeutic novelty. This flaw in the patent system has been exploited by the rise of combinatorial chemistry. This approach to new drug development makes it more cost-effective for pharmaceutical companies to channel scarce R&D dollars into developing "enantiomeric" permutations of existing blockbuster drugs rather than trying to develop drugs with truly novel therapeutic effects.
share rebates are exclusionary and limit competition, they probably are welfare enhancing overall because they shore up a weak patent system that is failing to protect true innovators from copiers. The development of the theoretical welfare economics of drug market share rebates will come in time. Our interest now is simply figuring out how drug rebates work as exclusionary devices. If we assume they are exclusionary, what does this imply for the distribution of rebate rates? What kinds of evidence would support or refute this hypothesis?
Our attempt to construct a distribution of rebate rate can be viewed as an update of a key element in a path-breaking study by Anna Cook of the effect of "substitutability" on brand name drug prices. 15 The study was based on data from 1994. The focus of Cook's study was generic substitution, as the Hatch-Waxman Bill has just recently been passed. The study required that drug expenditures be classified into three categories: (1) single source innovative (equivalent to today's on-patent brand drugs); (2) multiple source innovative (equivalent to today's off-patent brand drugs); and (3) generic drugs. Based on sample data, she found that 17.3% of sales represented generic drugs, 27.2% represented off-patented brand drugs, and 55.5% represented on-patent brand drugs. The focus of Cook's study was on the 27.2% market share of off-patent brand name drugs. Today, most estimates peg this share at less than 5%, which is indicative of how far we have since the passage of Hatch-Waxman. The focus today has shifted to therapeutic interchange-substitution of both generics and on-patent brands for other therapeutically equivalent on-patent brands. This requires a more refined subdivision of brand name drugs by substitution possibilities.
We start with our previously estimated 79.5% for brand name drugs' share of Medco's ingredient costs. Published reports place off-patent brand's share of total expenditures at less than 5% and we use a 4.5% figure, leaving a round 60 percentage points to subdivide. The subdivision of that percentage is presented in Table 5 below: Trying to divide on-patent drugs into two classes -with, and without, therapeutic equivalents-is speculative enough. But, we further subdivide on-patent drugs with therapeutic equivalents into those where the equivalents are lower cost generics and those where the equivalents are other brand name drug of near equal cost. We do this in preparation of our analysis of the costbenefits of switching to entities with business models less focused on unit drug prices and more focused on overall drug costs. The only saving grace in this speculative exercise is that a substantial portion of drug costs are concentrated in 10-15 therapeutic classes so the subdivision can be determined on a class-by class basis. Using data available of sales by top therapeutic class for 2003, we performed the following subdivision presented below in Table 6 . The first group represents three of the top 10 therapeutic classes where cost-effectiveness is most questionable.
Estimating Medco's Distribution of Received Rebate Rates
Now that we have a distribution of ingredient costs by substitution possibilities, we need to link that to a theory of drug market rebates. The basic idea is that both market share rebates and volume, or formulary rebates, are only paid by brand name drug manufacturers to PBMs and more specifically, only paid for drugs in order to create a barrier to "enantiomeric" entry. They are not paid in cases where it is felt that patent protection is sufficient, at the other extreme, in cases where the patent has expired and the manufacturer faces intense competition from generics that are near perfect substitutes. We believe that the share of sales in the top 10 selling therapeutic classes -25.4% in 2004 -is a good proxy for the share of brand name drugs requiring protection from potential new entrants. First of all, on-patent brand name drugs dominate sales in these therapeutic classes. Second, these "blockbuster" classes attract competition. It may be that one class --erythropoietins ---can never be threatened by an "enantiomeric" variation because of the biotechnological, rather than traditional chemical, nature of the drug class. Still, there are enough classes ranked 10 through 20 that can replace this class so that we still feel that the 25.4% figure is still a good estimate of the share of the drug market threatened by new entrants. A theory of why pharmaceutical companies pay volume rebates and market share rebates concurrently is still very much in development. We believe that the concentration of power in the PBM industry is the reason for the existence for volume rebates being paid. We believe that drug companies would only pay market share rebates if the PBM industry featured many buyers with no dominant firms.
Competing with Medco
Drug benefit costs are the product of "three U's" -usage, utilization mix, and unit prices. In the following statement from a recent 10-K statement to the SEC, Medco acknowledges that its core competency is in managing unit prices: 17 Our business model is designed to reduce this level of drug trend, primarily by obtaining competitive discounts and rebates from pharmaceutical manufacturers, obtaining competitive discounts from retail pharmacies and efficiently administering prescriptions filled through our mail order pharmacies 1 10-K SEC Fiscal year ending Dec 27, 2003
Critics say there will be benefits to reclaiming PBM functions from large independent PBMs, but there is little recognition that these PBMs have a rebate negotiating advantage over smaller entities. It is important to obtain quantitative estimates of this cost advantage in order to understand what it would take for smaller entity has to offset this advantage with an aggressive plan to increase the generic utilization rate.
The basis approach to is start with our disaggregation of Medco's weighted average rebate rate and inquire what would it look like if rebates were managed by smaller entities focused on "managed care not managed price" ™. This switch would not affect the distribution of substitutability, but it would affect the rates received in two classes. First, we believe that size matters with respect to volume rebates received. Medco has the power to influence the transaction of over 60 million lives through discretionary formulary design and compliance.
GPO that Hewitt Associates is proposing is expected to cover 5 million lives. 19 Medco can offer drug companies 12 times the market. We believe that Medco's coverage represents a major advantage over small entities in terms of drug companies' willingness to pay volume rebates. We place that difference at around 9 percentage points --a rate of 13.5% versus a rate of 4%.
Second, we do not believe that size matters with respect to transactions involving market share rebates. They are exclusionary devises offered to all entities with the power to make discretionary formulary design and compliance decisions. We assume that any switch will not affect the rates received. But, it will affect the share of expenditures garnering rebates.
Aggressive therapeutic interchange in three therapeutic classes --proton pump inhibitors, COX-2 inhibitors, and 2 nd generation antihistamines --is the best hope smaller entities have to offset
Medco's "managed price" advantage. But there is a cost --rebates from 3 of the top ten selling therapeutic classes goes to zero. We estimate that the result of switching to a smaller entity with a different business model is a decline of an average 4.8 percentage points in rebate rates. The calculations yielding this result are presented in Table 7 
